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Abstract
Holography suggests a considerable reduction of degrees of freedom in theories with gravity.
However it seems to be difficult to understand how holography could be realized in a closed
re–contracting universe. In this letter we claim that a scenario which achieves that goal will
eliminate all spatial degrees of freedom. This would require a different concept of quantum
mechanics and would imply an intriguing increase of power for the natural laws.
aEmail: dawid@thsrv.lbl.gov
1 Introduction
Recently the concept of holography attracted much attention. Motivated primarily by the
area law of black hole entropy the idea is that any theory involving gravity can be fully
described by a theory without gravity on the boundary, where the number of information
quanta is one per Planck area on the boundary [1]. The relevance of this holographic principle
is supported by the concept of matrix theory [2] which suggests a holographic nature and even
more so by the discovery of a duality between string theory on AdS space and a conformal
super Yang Mills theory on its boundary [3].
In this letter we want to deal with two general questions that arise in the context of hologra-
phy. The first question is how holography can be realized in a closed re–contracting universe.
As it was argued in [7], a straightforward estimate of the entropy in a closed universe is irrec-
oncilable with a holographic limit for the number of degrees of freedom. To make holography
consistent with a closed re–contracting universe, rather radical changes in the understanding
of the situation seem to be necessary.
The second question is an even more fundamental one. It asks about the meaning of the
notion of degree of freedom in principle, a question that is raised by the advent of holography.
The classical paradigm behind the notion of physical degrees of freedom is the following:
There exist physical laws which uniquely define the timely evolution of some initial state.
The space–like situation of this initial state is in principle unconstrained. The number of
degrees of freedom of a physical system denotes the number of possibilities to construct that
initial state. In a quantized framework this picture is slightly modified since the time–like
determinism is reduced by the uncertainty relation. However the basic conception of degrees
of freedom as a consequence of space–like freedom in contrast to time–like determinism
remains the same.
A holographic principle makes this distinction between determined and “free” directions
more problematic. It claims that the number of dimensions spanning the space of degrees
of freedom is not directly connected to the number of space–like dimensions. In some sense
the physical theory that determines time–like evolution is also able to reduce the freedom of
choice of a space–like initial state. Having started out in this direction, one could question
the concept of degree of freedom altogether. If a physical theory is able to abolish some of the
spatial degrees of freedom, why not all of them? Physical theories underwent a remarkable
evolution so far. While classical mechanics is merely a tool to describe and predict the
kinematics of given objects in a given space, today’s string theory tries to explain uniquely
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all qualitative features of the universe like types of particles and forces, number of dimensions,
etc. It seems to be the natural next step to aim at uniquely prescribing as well the individual
spatial localization of the objects that fill the universe. One can argue that a theory of the
world only deserves its name if the local spatial structure of this world is part of the theory.
We will call a theory that achieves that goal spatially unique.
In this letter we claim that the two questions described above are connected: The holographic
principle seems to imply spatial uniqueness in the case of a closed re–contracting universe.
In section two we give a simple toy-example of a spatially unique world. This example serves
merely as an illustration and is not an essential part of the main discussion. The reader who
is not interested in it can skip it without loosing the argument. Section three discusses the
basic arguments that suggest spatial uniqueness in a realistic cosmological setting. Section
four speculates on how quantum mechanics would have to change in this framework. We
end with conclusions.
2 A very simple example
At first sight the quest for a spatially unique theory might seem to be a rather over–ambitious
one. However, in this chapter we want to argue that even at a purely classical level it is not
out of reach. The property we need is naturally present in the currently much discussed AdS
space, though not too much appreciated there: A closed time dimension. The discussions of
AdS usually use the universal covering space to avoid this property. In the context of our
discussion it will be very useful.
We assume a classical toy universe with a rigid space–time characterized by a 2–dimensional
space–like sphere of radius R and a compactified time dimension.1 In this space–time we
assume a large number n of ideally elastic distinguishable balls with average diameter d
and average mass m which move around with a certain total energy and bounce into each
other. We only count balls which interact at least indirectly with the main group of balls.
Single balls or interacting subsets of balls which do not interact with any ball of the largest
interacting subset are invisible and therefore ignored.
Each phase space constellation of the n balls is considered one microstate. We formally treat
the number of microstates as a finite number and eventually send it to infinity. Our model
satisfies a time–like boundary condition F (t = 0) = F (t = T ) with F (t) being the microstate
of the system at time t and T being the length of the time dimension. We want to estimate
13 spatial dimensions are just slightly more complicated due to parity.
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how many initial microstates exist for a given T which are consistent with this condition. To
be able to do so we have to find scenarios where the number of consistent initial microstates
is still controlled by statistics. This is not the case if there exists any subset of microstates
whose histories are considerably less complex than the genuine system. Statistics of the
whole system would be blind against an increased number of consistent initial states among
those microstates. The basis for the formation of a less complex subset is some symmetry
that splits the system into smaller parts. Three types of less complex histories can result: a)
States that return to the initial state after a fraction of the prescribed time; b) states whose
histories always remain in a lower dimensional subspace; and c) states that can be split into
smaller identical sub–ensembles with identical histories.
a) can be excluded by defining the closed time length as the time up to the first reappearance
of the same microstate. Using that definition histories that return after a fraction of that
time are no solution for the chosen time length any more and don’t count.
b) can be excluded by taking nd > 2piR. In that case the system does not fit into a lower
dimensional subspace.
c) can be excluded by making n a prime number. In that case sub–ensembles can only exist
if the whole system lives in one dimension which has already been excluded above.
There obviously exists a direct connection between an initial microstate and its time inverted
state. If one is a consistent initial state, the other is as well, without telling anything new
since we do not have a global time arrow. We will therefore count pairs of initial microstates
which are the time inverted of each other and ask how many pairs are consistent initial
states.2.
Now we can start counting: Our system is characterized by a set G of 2N possible microstates
Fi at time t = 0 (a set G
′ of N states plus the N time inverted states). Each of those
microstates develops into some state of the same set G at the time t = T . Since we considered
a finite space, we can take the time period between t = 0 and t = T sufficiently long to allow
the assumption that each of the states in G can be realized with the same probability at
the time T . Now, as explained above, we forget about the time inverted half of our states.
Statistically the probability for one microstate of our set G′ of N states to satisfy F (t = 0) =
F (t = T ) is N−1. The average number of states Fi of G
′ for which F (t = 0) = Fi = F (t = T )
is one. The probability that there exist exactly n microstates that fulfill the condition above
2This counts some initial microstates which include non–interacting balls (if they interact in the time
inverted case) and double–counts the time inversion invariant initial microstates. However the first don’t
change statistics and the second are far too few to be statistically significant.
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is
P (n) = e−1(1− e−1)n (1)
The probability that exactly one microstate meets the condition therefore is
P (1) = e−1 − e−2 (2)
This means that with considerable probability there are no degrees of freedom in such world.
The described model is spatially unique for a large fraction of choices for the parameters of
our model.
An important question is whether our toy model can reproduce the second law of thermo-
dynamics at least locally. To discuss this we have to assume that the initial state has low
entropy. Genuinely this is a highly improbable assumption, however it is necessary for com-
paring our toy model with more realistic scenarios. One could formulate the assumption the
following way: We have, depending on the parameters T, N, E/m, R/d and the individual
diameters and masses of the balls, an infinite number of possible universes. We select the
small subgroup of them, whose single closed history passes through a low entropy state.
Now we want to discuss how a genuine closed history of a universe in this subgroup would
look like. We look at the universe at a certain time T1 << T . One can assume that the
decoupling of the boundary condition, i.e. the principle that any state at T can be reached
from T1 with the same probability is still valid. Therefore though the system is not a truly
statistical system, up to T1 it will genuinely behave like a thermodynamical system, because
the same statistical arguments that select the correct macrostate in a thermodynamical sys-
tem also define the probabilities for the one path that leads back to its initial state to sit
in some macrostate at T1. It is simply much more probable that the “right” path is one of
the many in the thermodynamically favoured macrostate than one of the few in some low
entropy macrostate.
The argument does not hold any more if the time period between T1 and T is too small since
in that case it becomes more unlikely for microstates far away from the initial state to be able
to return. The assumption of the same probability for all microstates is not valid any more.
Since we do not have a global time arrow, the whole argument described above holds for an
inverted time axis as well. Therefore one would naturally expect that the universe evolves
according to the second law of thermodynamics during its earlier phase and increasingly
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deviates from that path while approaching the point t = T/2.3 The fundamental laws of
thermodynamics are viable only in the first phase. In the middle phase of the universe the
“tendency” towards the initial state becomes stronger and entirely destroys the statistical
principle. The third phase of the universe shows an inverted entropy law and a negative time
arrow like it was proposed in a cosmological setting in [4], [5](withdrawn in [6]) and [10] in
a cosmological setting.
3 Cosmology
So far we have just discussed a simple toy universe to show that spatial uniqueness is noth-
ing absurd in principle. To make contact with the real world it is necessary to introduce
something like a compactified time dimension into a realistic cosmological scenario.
A closed time can only exist in a re–contracting universe since a universe that expands
for ever obviously does not allow an identification of different points in time. T must be
identified with the time period between big bang and big crunch. There exist two pure
types of spatially homogeneous re–contracting universes. The first achieves re–contraction
via a negative cosmological constant. This is the Anti DeSitter universe which has infinite
spatial extension. And the second is a closed universe with an over–critical mass content.
This second case is interesting for our purposes. From now on “closed universe” will always
denote a closed re–contracting universe.
At this point we come back to the holographic conjecture. In spaces other than AdS it is
not clear how a geometric picture of holography should look like since there is no nice notion
of a boundary of space. In [7] it was proposed to identify the boundary with the horizon of
the universe. In that case the question whether or not a holographic information bound is
obeyed for all time is decided by a race between the expansion of the universe (that decreases
the entropy density) and the expansion of the horizon (that decreases the ratio between the
horizon area and the volume it encloses). It was estimated that holography according to that
formulation is in principle consistent with the evolution of entropy in an open universe.4
However it fails in a closed universe provided one accepts the conventional identification
between entropy and degrees of freedom as well as a “thermodynamic” behaviour of the
universe throughout all times. Now these are exactly the principles we were ready to abolish
3This happens if T is too small to actually reach the maximal entropy. Otherwise the middle phase would
be a maximal entropy period.
4An investigation that comes to similar conclusions was done in [8] in the framework of pre-big-bang
cosmology.
6
to gain spatial uniqueness.
In the following we will not adopt the formulation of holography used in [7]. We will just
start with a very fundamental requirement that seems to be necessary for holography to
make sense: If holography is true, the number of possible microstates when the universe has
the size of the Planck length is one. This has to be the case coming from the big bang as well
as going into the big crunch. A holographic principle that does not enforce that condition
would have to use some “boundary” beyond the actual spatial realization of the universe and
therefore would loose its original meaning. If we accept this condition, a holographic closed
universe somewhat resembles a scenario with a closed time dimension. One could formally
make the identification by gluing together its Planck–scale sized ends.
It is interesting to note that the time–symmetric boundary conditions enforced by holography
show up as well if one tries to formulate a low entropy boundary condition for the wave
function of the universe [9]. The wave function of the universe can be formulated as the
functional integral
Ψ(hij) = K
∫
C
δg(x)exp[iSE(g)] (3)
where K is a normalization factor, SE is the classical gravity action and the integral sums
over all four geometries that eventually end at a space–like boundary with the induced three
metric hij . Since time is part of the four–space that is varied in the variation principle above,
different paths need different times to reach hij which means that time cannot be used as
a universal evolution parameter for Ψ. Consequently the state function of Ψ can only be
formulated as a time independent Schroedinger equation, the Wheeler DeWitt equation
HΨ(hij) = 0 (4)
where H is the gravitational Hamiltonian. If we want to introduce boundary conditions for
Ψ we cannot use time as a parameter. We have to use something connected directly to a
specific space–like surface, e.g. the actual extension of the universe. This however means
that the boundary conditions can only be imposed simultaneously for a certain extension
in the expanding as well as the contracting phase. The boundary conditions must be time–
symmetric [10].
To come back to the consequences of holography, let us sketch how the evolution of the
universe from minimal initial entropy can take place. This is nothing unusual and part of
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the the standard lore of cosmology. The universe starts from an initial quantum fluctua-
tion which induces the initial minimal entropy state. An inflationary period blows up the
universe exponentially and after re–heating the universe is in a state of rather high entropy
mainly carried by the photons in thermal equilibrium. From there on entropy is increased
by gravitational clumping due to small initial density variations. Eventually this gravita-
tional clumping will lead to the formation of black holes which carry an entropy per baryon
that is much higher than the photon/baryon ratio. Therefore, if the universe would behave
statistically throughout its evolution, black holes would dominate the entropy in the later
contracting phase of the universe.
Now the next question is, what must happen to return to the minimal entropy at the final
state. We have to note that the situation differs fundamentally from the situation in our
classical toy model. There we had the choice to pick exactly the right microstate at t = 0
and we found that there is approximately one such state. Now we have only one possible
initial microstate. Why should this state lead back to itself at t = T ? Let us consider the
number of microstates at t = T/2. If our system would be classically deterministic, we could
go back in time and be sure to find always exactly one microstate that is causally connected
to each state at t = T/2. The number of microstates would be constant. In our universe
however this is not the case and the reason lies in its quantum nature. In a universe that
initially has just one microstate the whole richness of possibilities emanates from quantum
fluctuations. Imagine the universe measures itself at t = T/2 to be in a specific state. This
means that the chain of factual quantum effects has led to this state while all the other
states are non–factual hypothetical results of all possible quantum “decisions” up to that
time. Consequently if we want to translate the principle of the toy model into a realistic
scenario, we have to replace the classical probabilities for specific initial states entirely with
quantum probabilities for specific quantum decisions during the evolution of the universe.
The boundary conditions imposed by holography act as “teleological” hidden parameters
that determine quantum decisions and guide the way back to the initial state.
Now we come to the crucial argument for spatial uniqueness. The maximal possible entropy
of the universe we can see respectively feel today, realized if all matter ends up concentrated
in a single black hole, would be
Smax = 10
123 . (5)
Therefore the finetuning of the universe to reach minimal entropy in the big crunch is higher
than exp(−10123). This represents an immensely specific selection of paths from the set
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of paths allowed by conventional quantum mechanics. This extreme selectivity will have a
strong impact on the character of local quantum decisions. A specific outcome of a mea-
surement that would be perfectly probable according to quantum statistics at that time
could well imply extremely improbable future quantum decisions in order to find its way
back to the holographically determined final state and therefore be virtually excluded. The
plausibility of a specific quantum decision at a certain time is determined not only by some
wave function at that time but by all future “probabilities” the state has to go through to
reach the final state. Thus it is impossible to keep the interpretation of the wave function
as something connected to a probability density for a specific outcome of a measurement at
a certain time.
The only way to keep a probability interpretation of the wave function would be to integrate
over the probabilities of a whole measured path5 throughout the evolution of the universe
and understand the integrated probability as the probability for the physical reality of a
certain measured evolution of the universe. However, since there is just one universe, there
is no way to understand the meaning of statistics in that context. Statistics only makes
sense if it is applied to a large set of events. It is definitely meaningless to keep a statistic
principle if its validity is reduced to one single event at all, namely the overall form of the
universe6. Using a statistical explanation for the quantum–dynamics of the universe in this
case is indistinguishable from not giving any explanation at all. Therefore the only way to
avoid loosing all control over the dynamics of the universe is to postulate a mechanism that
chooses unambiguously one measured path. This however, following the arguments above,
picks uniquely one spatial distribution at each point in time, in other words it means spatial
uniqueness.
We started off by demanding holography for a closed universe and we ended up abolishing
all spatial degrees of freedom. How does this fit into a geometrical picture and how can it be
compared to the AdS case? Holography on AdS relies on two basic properties: 1) There are
no Cauchy surfaces in AdS. In other words physics on AdS does not entirely emanate from
an initial state at a time t = 0 but always gets new input from the boundary. 2) There is the
nonlocal character of observables in gravity. This enforces a situation where the boundary
defines physics in the bulk entirely.
5It is important to distinguish the measured path from a trajectory in the path integral. We assume that
the universe continuously measures itself through self interaction and therefore makes a continuous chain
of quantum decisions that define its state at each stage modulo the fundamental quantum uncertainty. An
evolution of the universe defined by this chain of measurements we call a measured path.
6This does not change at all if one uses the notion of Everett branching. There is no philosophically
sound way to define a statistical principle that covers a set of non–interacting parallel universes.
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In the case of a closed universe we have again two basic properties. 1) Cauchy surfaces
do exist. Thus the whole evolution of the universe emanates from an initial state. 2) We
have seen that gravity, if holographic, uniquely determines the initial state and its evolution.
This is to some extent reminiscent of the AdS case: An initial state in the bulk does not
contribute to the number of degrees of freedom of the system. But, because of 1) it is more
than that: It implies spatial uniqueness. This is also reflected in the geometric picture of a
boundary on which all information of the enclosed space can be stored. If one encloses some
space inside a boundary and then maximizes this space, in a closed universe the boundary
will shrink to a point and therefore the information capacity there will be reduced to zero.
We do not see how this type of argument could be adapted to tell anything new about
holography in eternally expanding universes.
4 Prospects and problems of a new quantum principle
We do not have a specific proposal for a deterministic principle that could lead to a phe-
nomenologically reasonable world. In this section we will just discuss some basic properties
which should be realized in such a concept and mention some important problems.
The essential character of the required quantum principle must be the following: On one side
it has to abolish the statistical nature of quantum mechanics to satisfy the holographic bound.
But on the other side it has to keep the uncertainty principle to allow an increase of “possible”
microstates during the evolution of the universe. This might look rather strange at first sight,
however there is no contradiction in it. While the uncertainty principle is a direct implication
of the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics, rooted in the non–commutativity
of conjugate operators, the identification of the wave function with the square root of a
probability density represents an additional interpretative step. While the mathematical
description remains at the level of wave mechanics, the probability interpretation is based
on the introduction of an additional selection principle, in the Copenhagen interpretation
the concept of contraction of the wave function in an experiment. Of course the statistical
interpretation of the wave function is well founded in our observation of the world, however
there is no reason to believe that this statistical interpretation cannot be replaced by some
new principle that achieves the same phenomenology up to our stage of the universe. Due to
their “teleological” nature the hidden parameters that select the measured path are surely
nonlocal and do not violate Bell’s inequalities. The world is totally deterministic but not
exactly well defined, there remains a core of uncertainty of observables that is irreducible by
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experiment.
The most natural approach towards a quantum principle of the described type would be
to define a pseudo–classical action principle that exactly chooses the measured path with
the highest over all “probability”. The word “probability” in this context is just used for
traditional reasons but has lost its original meaning, therefore it is set under quote. Obviously
this approach would be impossible in a world without a final boundary condition. It would
force each quantum decision towards the most probable outcome and therefore could not
provide the observed statistical character of the quantum world. In a closed universe however
the boundary conditions enforce local decisions of various “probabilities”. Nevertheless it
is not easy to imagine how a realistic phenomenology could be realized. There exist two
fundamental problems: How can an action principle lead to a quantum statistics whose
distribution is controlled exactly by the square of the wave function and not by the wave
function to some arbitrary power. And why does the selected path lead to a universe that is
not ideally isotropic but shows the observed density perturbations. Even if a scenario could
answer those two questions, probably it would still have to fix a certain maximal extension of
the universe as an additional boundary condition (analog to the fixing of a certain duration
T in the classical case). Otherwise the highest “probability” solution should always be the
trivial case of non–existence.
What follows are some short remarks on other sensitive points. The T–invariant character
of the universe in the discussed scenario requires a T–invariant conception of quantum me-
chanical measurement that is not realized in the conventional chronological concept of the
contraction of the wave function. There exists a formulation of quantum mechanics without
a time arrow [11, 12] that can be applied to our framework.
A second remark concerns the return to the same microstate that is required in our frame-
work. According to [12] in a world where gravitational effects can be neglected and de–
coherence is exactly realized, no nontrivial history leads back to its initial state. In our case
however in the crucial early and late phases of the universe both conditions are not fulfilled
and the argument does not apply.
Another question is whether the effects of a symmetric re–contracting universe should have
been seen in experiments. In fact there exists an experimental result [13] that excludes a
closed time–symmetric universe based on the would–be–effects of symmetric propagation
of star light, provided there exist no “unnatural conspiring relations” that could hide this
effect. However, as remarked in several works that consider time–symmetric universes (see
e.g. [10]), such unnatural conspiring relations that could e.g. enhance photon scattering and
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tune its direction in a middle phase of the universe in any case constitute an essential part
of a time–symmetric universe scenario. Therefore it seems very difficult to make any real
statement based on experiment in that respect.
Finally one has to say that the closed universe scenario has lost some of its appeal recently
because of measurements of distant supernovae which hint towards an open universe with
a positive cosmological constant [14]. Still it is probably too early to draw final theoretical
conclusions from those measurements.
5 Conclusion
In this letter we tried to make plausible that a holographic nature of the universe seems
to imply spatial uniqueness if the universe is closed. It remains to be seen whether the
required quantum principles can be formulated in an exact way and can in fact reproduce
the quantum phenomena and gravitational phenomena of our observed world. However we
want to emphasize once more that the consequences of finding a realistic scenario of that
type would be enormously gratifying.
A highly attractive picture would emerge. The model would eliminate the indeterminism
of quantum mechanics without local hidden parameters. It would avoid the problematic
notion of increasing entropy in a contracting universe. And finally it would establish spatial
uniqueness as a defining condition of the world. While the qualitative features and the
evolution in time with all its parameters could be uniquely prescribed by some M–, or other
theory, the fact that the universe is closed together with the holographic principle would
uniquely prescribe the world’s concrete realization in space. The notion of reality in the
world would be reduced to the notion of reality of the natural laws.
Seen in this light the obstacles against reconciling holography with a closed universe in a
conventional way can be understood as a hint towards a role of the physical laws that is
much more powerful than it is estimated today.
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